A NEW AND OLD READING ON THE FOURTH
SECTION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
"lerein. though I could not be ignorant of the difficulty of
matter, which he that taketh in hand shall soon find, or much less of
my own unableness, which I had continual sense and feeling of; yet
because I had more means of absolution than the younger sort, and
more leisure than the greater sort. I did think it not impossible to work
some profitable effect; the rather because where an inferior wit is bent
and conversant upon one subject, he shall many times with patience
and meditation dissolve and undo many of the knots, which a greater
wit distracted with many matters would rather cut in two than unknit:
And at least if my invention or judgment be too barren or too weak;
yet by the benefit of other arts, I did hope to dispose or digest the
authorities or opinions * * * in such order and method, as they
should take light one from another, though they took no light from
me."--Sir Francis Bacon's Reading on the Statute of Uses.

It is one of the elementary rules for the construction of
statutes altering the Common Law that technical words of
law are presumed to have been used in a technical sense;
in other words, that the legislature is presumed to have
understood the old law, the mischief of which they intended
to remedy.

It is another equally well established rule that in construing such statutes the courts should have regard to the old
law, the mischief, and the remedy, and they should so construe the statute as to suppress the mischief and advance
the remedy. In doubtful cases where the application of
either of the above rules would lead to a conclusion contrary to that produced by the application of the other-the
technical meaning of words being at war with a just and
reasonable legislative intention-the technical meaning of
the words should be abandoned.
Where, however, giving technical terms their full effect
they produce in all cases only just and reasonable results
in their application to the mischief to *be remedied, this
interpretation of the legislative intention is most probably
correct

To rightly interpret that sub-section of the fourth sec(6ri)
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tion of the statute of frauds. which declares that "no action shall be brought upon any special promise to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person," etc.,
the writer submits that we should first ascertain whether
the statute contains technical terms, i. e., terms having a
definite meaning to the lawyers of the Restoration; and,
second, after determining the old law and the mischief
apply the statute so as to remedy the mischief.
If the statute read, "No action shall be brought upon
any contract to answer for the debt, default, etc., of another, etc.," or, "No action shall be brought upon any agreement to answer for the debt, etc., of another," this language to the minds of many lawyers of the present day
would be the equivalent of that employed by the British
Parliament, in 1677. But those words are not the words
of the Act. Did the words employed by the framers of
the act-"no action shall be brought upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default, etc., of another person"-mean anything different?
If the term "special
promise" had no different meaning, why was it employed?
If the terms "contract" and "agreement" mean the same
thing as "special promise" why was neither of those words
here employed?
Section 4 speaks of "agreements made upon consideration of marriage" and of "contract or sale of lands." The
terms "agreement" and "contract" were therefore familiar
in the law of the seventeenth century. Was it by mere
chance or was it by design that they were not used and
the term "special promise," was employed in announcing
the legislative prohibition of a parol guaranty?
Professor Ames, is the first writer of our day who has
attempted to restore the significance of the distinction between a debt and a special promise in the interpretation of
the statute of frauds. In a brief but suggestive passage,'
"The distinction between Debt and Special Assumpsit, as illustrated in the cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph, is of practical value in determining whether a promise is in certain cases within
the Statute of Frauds relating to guaranties. If B gets the enjoy-
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he shows that where the promise is contemporaneous with

the original credit, the question whether or not the statute
applies is solved by answering the question whether a special promise or a debt has been created. In the former
alternative, the statute applies because the statute bars action upon any verbal "special promise." In the latter alternative, though a parol debt may have been created, the
statute has no application, because the English Parliament,
in 1677, said nothing about parol debts in Section 4 (except marriage agreements) and did not deprive the creditor
of a remedy thereon except as provided subsequently in
Section 17.

It is not, however, the writer's purpose to dwell longer
at present on the above well recognized distinction 2 than
is necessary to make it serve as a piece of evidence in sup-

port of the thesis of this paper.
All promises to pay the debt of another are either of
ment of the benefit furnished by the plaintiff at A's request, but A is
the only party liable to the plaintiff, A's promise is not within the
statute. If, on the other hand, B is liable to the plaintiff for the bene-

fit
received, that is, is a debtor, A's promise is clearly a guaranty and
within the statute."-VIII Harvard Law Review, pp. 263-264.
'A further discussion and application of this distinction to American cases will be found in Professor Ames' Cases on Suretyship, pp.
1, 2, 3, 4 and notes; also in the writer's "Leading Cases on the Fourth
Section of the Statute of Frauds," pp. 12-2o. On the early English
cases before the statute see Hare on Contracts p. 122.
Prior to the statute the action on the case was very commonly
brought ex. g., "in consideration that the plaintiff would deliver unto the
defendant's son such wares, etc., did assume and promise unto the
plaintiff that he would pay the plaintiff for them, etc." There was
judgment for plaintiff. Johnson v. Abington, Styles 163 (1649). Immediately after the statute this distinction controls the decisions. Anonymous, i Vent. 293 (x677) ; Anderson v. Hayman, i H. Bl. T20 (1789).
Though courts have generally adhered to this test and said that
the sole credit must be given to the defendant in order to render him
liable on his promise to pay for goods delivered to or services rendered to another, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, p. 3, note 2, the reason
for the distinction as pointed out by Professor Ames has however
gradually faded out of the judicial consciousness.
The gradual obliteration of the distinction between a debt and a
special promise may be seen from the language of Wood L C. B. in
Cope v. Joseph, 9 Price, at p. i6o (i821).
It will be hereinafter contended that in the humble judgment bf
the writer the disregard of this di-tinction
produced an erroneous
decision in Sutton v. Grey, L. R. x, Q. B. 28 5 (1893).
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class (A) : promises made when the debt of the other person is contracted; or of class (B): promises made afterwards-to pay a pre-existing debt. As above stated, Professor Ames has directed attention to cases of class (A)
and has referred to numerous decisions showing that the
English courts in the time of the Restoration and later
held that if by a parol transaction the defendant became a
debtor, the statute had no application, but that if the defendant became a special promisor, to answer for any
credit given to another, the statute applies.
But why should we not also examine cases of class (B)
in the light of the contract law contemporaneous with the
statute ?
It has been aptly said by Comstock, C. J. in Mallory v.
Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412 (186o) :
A novation. i.r. where the pre-existing debt is extinguished simultaneously with the creation of the new, is plainly
outside the statute.
"The statute points to no distinction between a debt created at the time when the collateral engagement is made, and
one having a previous existence. The requirement is, that
promises to answer for the debt, &c., of a third person, be
in writing. The original and collateral obligations may
come into existence at the same time, ;nd both be the foundation of the credit; or the one may exist and the other be
created afterwards. In either case, and equally in both, the
inquiry under the statute is, whether there be a debtor and
a surety, and not when the relation was created."
One naturally asks, were all contracts involving
the payment of another's pre-existing debt "special
promises to answer for the debt, etc., of another
person"? If the defendant became liable as a debtor though
the payment of this new debt would discharge another's preexisting debt the defendant would not be merely a special
promisor. He would be liable as debtor. If the defendant
became liable in the action of account he would not be merely a special promisor, he would be a bailee or receiver to ac-
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count, and therefore an accountant. If the defendant has
become accountable to his bailor and the amount with which
he is chargeable will go in discharge of the pre-existing debt
of another person, the defendant is nevertheless a bailee
or a receiver; i. e., an accountant, he is not merely making
a special promise.
Consistency in interpretation requires that if a new debt,
though parol, is created, which involves the payment of a
prior debt of a third party, the statute has no application.'
If a new parol promise amounts to nothing but a special
promise or assumpsit, though on a consideration sufficient

to have supported an action prior to the statute, the statute
bars recovery.
In other words, I submit that in the English law of Contracts at the date of the statute, there were three species
of simple contracual liability, as later set forth in Buller's
Nisi Prius (p. 126):

(i) Accountability, dependent upon a bailnent.
(2) Debt, dependent upon quid pro quo, which might
arise upon sale or loan or on some act done on request.
(3) Assumpsit or special promise dependent upon consideration.
I shall endeavor to show that the practical distinction
between these three species of contract was the reason why
the English Parliament endeavoring, in 1677, to suppress
the perjurous falsification of parol guaranties denounced
parol special promises or assumpsits but left untouched
parol debts, and parol accountabilities; and finally, it is proposed to show that the distinction thus made by the British Parliament should still be preserved between these three
species of contract in order to apply the statute to-day to
the effective suppression of perjury.
The expression "special promise," etc., means special
assumpsit3
'On an "Assumpsit
. . that the defendant, in consideration
that the plaintiff would forbear to proceed upon the capias utlagaturn
I . assumed that if B did not pay the debt that he would pay
it, the plaintiff obtained judgment in Jennings v. Harley, Cro. Eliz.
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A parol special promise to answer for the debt, etc., of
another person could be established by proving the defendant's inducing promise and the plaintiff's detriment (usually forbearance to sue the plaintiff's debtor). As forebearance was merely a passive state on the part of the creditor plaintiff, the perjurer or suborner of perjury could
easily enable the plaintiff to recover by fabricating the defendant's promise and by showing the creditor's mere passivity thereupon. Parliament by the statute declared that
no action should be brought "upon any special promise to
909 (44-45 Eliz.). So assumpsit lay in Rippon v. Norton, Cro. Elir.
MST.in consideration of plaintiff's desisting from making any complaint to a justice of the peace. So in "Assumpsit for that the defendant in consideration the plaintiff would forbear to sue one J. S., on
an obligation . . . promised to pay, &c.,"it was adjudged for the

plaintiff in Mapes v. Sidney, Cro. Jac. 683. So in "Assumpsit for that
the testator was indebted

. . . and the defendant . .

assumed

that if he forbore to sue him until such a time he would pay . . .
it was adjudged for the plaintiff" in Fisher v. Richardson, Cro. Jac.
47. In Therne v. Fuller, Cro. Jac. 396, an assumpsit was successfully
maintained on defendants promise to pay the debt of another "in consideration that the plaintiff at the defendants request . . . would
assent and be content to desist from further prosecution of the said
suit."

See I Rolle Abr. 27 pl. 49.

Rosyer brought "an action upon the case upon an assumpsit against
L. a femme administratrix. and declares that the defendant in consideration that lie would forbear suit until she had taken out letters
of administration, did assume and promise to pay. &e."and recovered
in Rosyer v. Langdale, Styles, 248 (i65o). So in Finerv. Jeffry, Styles,
57 (1648). the plaintiff "brings an action upon the case against J and
declares, that the defendant did assume and promise unto him that
if he would forbear to sue one who had assaulted him and beaten him
that he, the defendant, would pay, &c.,"
and obtains judgment.
165. Iume v. Ilinton, Styles. 304. The creditor of the son obtains judgment against his mother in an action upon the case. Wherein
the declaration averred that "she
. . did assume and promise unto
the plaintiff that if he would stay for the money till Mich. next, that
then she would pay it."
In Sheppard's Abridgment, Part I (London, 1675), the following
use of the term special promise is made:
"That the contract or agreement that shall contain an assumpsit,
and give an action upon the case upon it must be verbal, and not on
a deed in writing, for this action will not lie upon a deed sealed and
delivered, nor for a rent on a deed nor upon an especialty or Record
without some special promise made collaterally in the case. Croo. 2,
5o5. 665, 668; Brownl. 2. IT. 17; Owen, 163."
Thus in the Precedents by Sir Edward Lutwyche. Knight, Vol, I,
p. 271, lately one of the Judges of the Common Bench, London, 1704;
"Yeoman v. Barstow, Trin, 13 W. 3 Regis, Narr. en Assumpsit sur

special promise.!
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answer for the debt, etc., of another person."

All assump-

sits based on consideration thenceforth became impossible
of enforcement. Before the statute forbearance in any
form whatever was only a consideration. Before the statute, forbearance to sue was never known to create a debt.'
'In 1422, in the Common Pleas, the plaintiff brought an action of
debt on a promise to pay a judgment against T, the defendant, promising that he would become debtor for the said sum if the plaintiff
would release his execution against T. Plaintiff released his execution and the release was of record. Held, the promise was a nudurn
pactumn.

i Y. B., 9 H. V., page 14, pl. 23.

As to which case Brooke makes this illuminating gloss:
"It is seen that action on the case upon the promise lies, but not
debt because there is not a quid pro quo." Brooke's Abridgment, p.
232, no. 2o6.
See Sheppard's Abr. Title Debt reporting a similar and later case.
In Jordan's case, Y. B. 27, H. VIII Fol. 24, pl. 3 (Yetsweirt, London, 1597), there was likewise a pre-existing debt and the Action on
the Case was held to lie upon a promise to pay it in consideration of
the debtor's discharge from prison.
The defense was made that debt would lie and not case. The Court
held that debt would not lie.
Brook: "And besides as to that which has been said that the
plaintiff shall have writ of debt and not this action, I am of a contrary opinion, for I understand that one shall not have writ of debt
except where there is a contract for the defendant has not quid pro
quo, but the action is only based upon the promise."
The doctrine of Jordan's case that forbearance in any form could
not create a debt has remained the law of England to the latest day.
Harburg India Rubber Co. v. Martin, L. R. r,K. B. 778 (1902). In
no form has forbearance ever been held to be the quid pro quo of a
debt, and the only writ successfully employed has been the action on
the case on the contract of assumpsit. Rogers v. Snow, Dalison, 94
(i5 Eliz.).
Some of the innumerable illustrations of forbearance promises
(where the action on the case upon the assumpsit was successfully
maintained) are the following:
Forbearance until Michaelmas gave rise to an Assumpsit in Thornton v. Kemp, Gouldsborough, 146 (Hilary Term, 43 Eliz.); a stay of
execution against a third person on request of the defendant gave
rise to an assumpsit in Jennings v. 1atley, Yelverton, i9 (44 & 45 Eliz.).
An agreement by a pawnee not to sell the goods of his debtor for
three days upon the defendant's promise to pay the debt. Capper v.
Dickington, i Rolle Rep. 215 (3 Jac. z).
Thus a discharge of a debtor from imprisonment on request gave
rise to an action on the case in Atkinson v. Settree, Willes' Reports, 482

(744).

In 1653, Sheppard's "Faithful Counsellor; or, the Marrow of the
Law in England," p. 226, thus emphasizes the fact that forbearance to
sue will not create a debt:
"But if J. S. owe me money and another comes to me and intreat
me to take him debtor for this money, and promise to pay me at Mich-
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Sir Matthew Hale, in 'Milton's case,' stated unqualifiedly
that "acceptance does not create a duty, no more than a
promise by a stranger to pay if the creditor will forbear
his debt."
English courts have ever since 1677 consistently treated
cases of forbearance as cases within the statute.

In the King's Bench, in 1731, "Raymond, C. J., held
that a parol promise to pay the debt of another in con-

sideration of forbearance, was void by the statute of frauds
and perjuries."
In 1797, Chater v. Beckett,T presented the facts that the
plaintiff had a special capias ad satisfaciendum against Harachnas I cannot have this Action (. e.,Debt), upon this Contract,
9 11. 5, 14. 44, Ed. 3, 21. If a man promise me twenty pounds to marry
his daughter, and I do marry her, I may have this Action for this
Debt. F. N. B. 120."
The only intimation that the writer has found to the effect that
forbearance could create a debt is in a case cited by Prof. Ames, in
8 llarv. Law Rep., p. 251, Bedwell v. Catton, Hob. 216 (15 Jac.).
Even if this case was a distinct decision, I should hesitate, in view
of the above authorities, to believe the proposition that forbearance
would create a debt. It appears, however, that-in the case cited the
action was not debt at all but Case. and that the quotation is a mere
dictum. The point really decided by the case was that assumpsit in
consideration of forbearance executed would lie against the executor
upon the promise of the testator. The defendant's contention was
that though the contract of debt would survive, assumpsit would not.
The Court, sustained the action against the executor by the argument
that as debt was known to survive, assumpsit ought to survive, for
that the assunmpsit might have been based on as beneficial a consideration as the quid pro quo of a debt. The Court cited no authority to
the effect that forbearance created a debt and does not so state or
decide lut merely cites the familiar case of the creation of a debt in
favor of a surgeon by his performing medical services on request. It
is common knowledge that the receipt of chattels or the performance
of some physical act or service on request would always be a sufficient quid pro quo. The writer submits that the dictum is not entitled
to even the weight given to it by Prof. Ames, for neither was the
point involved, whether forbearance could create a debt, nor did the
Court so state ar.quendo.
'Hardres, 485.
aI Strange. 1873 (1731). In Vaters %.Glassop, i Ray, 357 (1O W. 3),
there was a recovery on a promise to pay the debt of the son of the defoidant in consideration of forbearance, but the statute does not appear to have been invoked and there is, in fact, nothing to show that
the promise was parol.
SDurnford & East, 20! (1797).
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ris, whereupon in consideration that the plaintiff at the
instance of the defendant would stay all further proceedings against Harris, and would accept certain bills of exchange drawn or accepted by the defendant for a certain
part, to wit, ios. in the pound of his said debt as a satisfaction for the whole, the defendant undertook and promised to give the plaintiff such bills for the same and to pay
all the expenses which the plaintiff had been put to in and
about the said intended commission, the writ, and the meetings of the creditors; that the plaintiff stayed all proceedings against Harris and accepted such bills, etc., yet that
the defendant had not paid the said expenses or any part
thereof."
Lord Kenyon, distinguishing the case from Read v.
Nash s on the ground that in Read v. Nash "Johnson was
not a debtor, the case was not tried. . . . Whereas
in this case Harris was indebted to the plaintiff and the
defendant undertook to pay part of that debt and to pay
certain other expenses," held the promise to be within the
statute. Here there was nothing done but the exercise of
forbearance and hence no debt.
In 1821, Saunders v. WVakefild,9 is another case of mere
forbearance. The plaintiff agreed to forbear the prosecution of a pending suit against one Pitman and the defend'r Wils. 3o5 (1751).
The plaintiff's testator Tuack had brought an action of assault and
battery against one Johnson. Nash, the present defendant, being in
court and the case being about to be tried, promised Tuack "in
consideration that Tuack would not proceed to trial, but w.ould withdraw his record." to pay him 5oi and the costs in that suit to be taxed
till the time of withdrawing the record. It was held that "Johnson
was not a debtor, the cause was not tried, he did not appear to be
guilty of any default or miscarriage, there might have been a verdict
for him, etc."
The writer suggests as the correct explanation of this case that
until the decision of Kirkham v. Marter, 2 Barn. & Ald. 613 (1817),
the word "miscarriage" in the statute was not supposed to include
tortious liabilities.
'4 B. & Aid. 595 (1821). Accord: Tonlinson v. Gell, i N. & P. 588
(1837), the consideration being a stay of proceedings by a solicitor in
a suit in chancery.
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ant's verbal promise to pay Pitman's debt was held tnenforceable.
In 1849, in Gull v. Lindsay,10 the plaintiff, having merely
the right to collect freight charges, abandoned that right in
consideration of the defendants' promise to pay plaintiffs'
commission to secure which the right to collect the freight
charges had been assigned by the former owners, no debt
was created as no property was transferred, and the plaintiff merely surrendered a chose in action.
Clearly distinguishable from the foregoing and entirely
reconcilable therewith are the cases where the plaintiff
having seized the body of his debtor on a ca. sa. lets him
go at large upon the defendant's promise to pay the debt.
Here there is a novation by the act of the creditor. The
debt was discharged simultaneously with the creation of
the defendant's assumpsit in Goodman v. Chase, i B. & Ald.
297 (i818); Butcher v. Stcuart, ii M. & W. 856 (1843).
The decision in Rcader v. Kingham, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 344
(1862), holding that a promise to the bailiff of the creditor in consideration of forbearance was not within the statute when correctly understood presents no difficulty. The
Court of Comnon Pleas rested the decision absolutely on
the basis that the statute meant a promise to the creditor.
Erle, C. J.: "The debt was due to Malins from Hitchcock:
the promise was made to Reader. It has been distinctly
settled, that, to bring the promise within the statute, the
Williams and
promisee must be the original creditor."
Byles, J. J. delivered opinions to that same effect.
In Love's case (I Salkeld, 28; B. R. 5 Anne, abt. 1707),
there was a promise to a sheriff to pay the debt if the latter
would restore the goods taken in execution. No question
was made of the application of the statute and the plaintiff
recovered.
The latest expression of judicial opinion in England is in
Ilarburg India Rubber Co. v. Martin, L. R., I K. B. 778,
a decision of the Court of Appeal, in 19o2. Three of the
"4 Exch. 45 (1849).
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Lord Justices delivered qjuite extensive opinions reviewing
previous decisions and concurring in the conclusion that the
defendant, the stockholder, and director of a judgmentdebtor-corporation, was not liable on his parol promise to
pay the judgment made in consideration of the plaintiff's
withdrawal of a writ of fieri facia s.
The English courts from King v. Wilson, 1 in 1731,
down to Harburg India Rubbcr Co. v. Martin, in 19o2,12
have steadily adhered to the doctrine that consideration
consisting of forbearance in any form cannot remove a
promise made to the creditor from the condemnation of the
statute.
"It seems now to be everywhere agreed," says Professor Ames, "that a promise to a creditor to pay him the
debt of another, in consideration of mere forbearance by
the creditor is within the statute of frauds.""3 The writer
firmly believes that such ought to be the law everywhere;
but unfortunately, some American decisions, wholly at variance with the above line of English cases, adopt as a criterion a question of fact requiring due process of judicial
telepathy for its detenination-whether the defendant's
main or only his subordinate purpose was to pay the debt of
another; and whether his main or only his subordinate purpose was to subserve some purpose of his own.
Into what an inextricable quagmire of doubt the decisions of Pennsylvania have sunk by adopting this criterion,
the writer has endeavored to show in detail elsewhere.14
This supposed test is adopted in some other jurisdictions.1 "
112 Strange, 873 (1731).
12L. K x, K. B. 778 (1902).
" Ames Cases on Suretyship, p. 84 note I.
"Leading Cases on the Fourth Section of the Statute of Frauds,
PP. 49, 52, 67, 72.
" Many American decisions, though containing dicta to the effect
that a parol promise to pay the debt of another is enforceable "whenever the main purpose and object of the proinissor is not to answer
for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of
his own, involving either a benefit to himself or damage to the other
contracting party" will be found on scrutiny to be cases of bailments
or receiverships to account. Thus the above italicized excerpt was
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In sharp contrast to the negative and passive character
of a forbearance is the positive, physical and visible act of
bailment.
At the (late of the enactment of the statute the action of
Account had been for some four hundred years and still
was a familiar remedy. Accountability, i. e., the duty to
render a written account concerning the defendant's disposition of chattels or money bailed (that is delivered), to
him by the plaintiff, had been for ages past not only the
appropriate and customary remedy, of the lord of the
manor against his bailiff or of the ward against his guardian in socage but had also frequently been employed by a
plaintiff against a defendant who was not his customary
bailiff but his bailiff pro hac vice to sell goods or chattels
and to render an account. The facts essential to constitute the duty to render an account were, (i) the delivery
of chattels or money to the defendant; and, (2) his agreement to render an account to the plaintiff concerning his
disposition thereof.
The liability of a defendant to account could never be
established without proof of a bailment of money or goods
to him.' 6 This physical transaction or the consequent physical change of possession with respect to the possession of
the property could be seen and witnessed with comparative
certainty on the part of bystanders or neighbors. Promises in consideration of forbearance on the contrary sounded
in mere words and mental conditions, though perjury as
to a bailnent was of course conceivable. It would be
taken from a case where the defendant received securities "deemed
by him and the company adequate, at the time, to indemnify him
against his contract with the plaintiff." Recovery was permitted.
Emerson v. Slater, 22 How. 28 (1859).

:'Sheppard's Abridgment, London, 1675. Title Accompt.
"What then are the facts which must exist in order to induce the
law to raise an obligation to account? First, the person upon whom
srch an obligation is sought to be imposed (and whom we will call
the defendant) must have received property of some kind not belonging to himself, for otherwise lie will have nothing to account for or
to render an account of."-Professor Langdell in II Harvard Law
Review, pp. 243, 244-
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more difficult to induce witnesses to swear to the transfer of money or goods where none had been transferred
than to induce them to paint and varnish a mcre verbal
request for leniency so as to make it appear in court as a
special pronise to answer for the debt of another person.
Perjury as to a bailment or conveyance can seldom be
successful. Res ipsa loquitur.
If the action of account, as above stated, wa in common
use at the period of the Restoration when the statute was
passed,1 7 the silence of Parliament respecting a parol ac" In 1653 Sheppard's "Faithful Counsellor," &c., page 23. thus stated
the above familiar doctrine: "If I deliver to another money, corn or
.
. if it be
wares to account for, or to employ to any purpose
not done and the thing not restored to me, I may recover it by this
action;" i. e., by action of Account. See also Franklin's Case, Styles,
388 (1653).
In 1675 an action of account by church wardens against a late
church warden and the declaration is printed in "The Attorney's Practice in the Court of King's Bench," London, 1759.
Sheppard's Abridgment (London, 1675), Title Accompt.
In 31 Cas. 11. an action of account by the executor of a merchant
was brought against his factor as bailiff, and the declaration is printed
at length, pp. 36, 37, of the last mentioned work.
In Tawdin v. Lavie, Lilly's Entries, p. 13 (1758), this declaration in
account appears:
"James Tawdin, the younger, and James Frontin, executors of the
last will and testament of James Tawdin, the elder, deceased, complain
of Henry Lavie, merchant, being in the custody of the marshal of
the Marshalsea of the Lord the King, before the King himself, in
a plea that he render to them a reasonable account from the time that
he was bailiff of the said James Tawdin the elder, and receiver of
the money of the said James in his lifetime, at Westminster in the
county aforesaid, for this, to wit, that whereas the said Ih-nry from
the :oth day of May in the 31st year of the reign of the Lord Charles
the second now King of England, &c., until the 30th day of September in the 32nd year of the reign of the said now Lord the King at
Westminster in the county aforesaid, was bailiff of the said James the
testator in his life-time, and for all the same time had the care and
administration of divers goods and chattels of the said James Tawdin
the elder, to wit, of two hundred thousand pounds of pewter, thirty
firkins of stub-nails, two hundred and twenty-four pounds of spelter,
forty thousand pounds of lead, and five hundred and fifty pounds of
tunic glass, to the value of L3ooo, to wit, at Westminster aforesaid in

the county aforesaid, to merchandize and make profit thereof for the
said James Tawdin the elder, and a reasonable account thereof to
the same James the testator, when he should be thereunto required,
to render, and receive of the monies of the said James Tawdin
the elder, for the whole time aforesaid, and for the same time did
receive of the monies of the said James Tawdin the testator, at
Westminster aforesaid, by the hands of Peter Pontoise L113 5d.
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countability involving the discharge of another person's
debt indicates an intention that no writing or memoranduni of such transactions will be required. Likewise in
common use was the action of debt, and its then comparatively recent and then modern remedial equivalent the

action of Indcbitatus Assumpsit.18
If A bails his own goods to B, authorizing B to sell them
and pay him, A, the proceeds, the bailee, B, is liable to A
in an action of account.

9

If the plaintiff as creditor, having a lien by mortgage or
pledge or a common law lien on chattels or having by levy
acquired a lien on goods or lands of his debtor, subsequently transferred the property subject thereto to
the defendant in pursuance of the latter's agreement to

dispose of this property and apply the proceeds to the debt
the defendant was clearly a bailee to account
If instead of an agreement to apply the proceeds the defendant's promise was to pay a given sum to the plaintiff
20
at all events, the defendant had made himself a debtor.
and there by the hands of Peter Chabot L9 and there by the proper
hands of the said Henry Lavie 196o of lawful money of England; to
render a reasonable account thereof to the said James the testator,
when he should be thereunto required: Nevertheless the said Henry
Lavie, although often required, &c. that reasonable account of the said
James Tawdin the elder in his life-time, or to the same James Tawdin
the younger and James Frontin, or either of them, after the death
of the said James Tawdin the testator, hath not rendered but that to
the said James the testator, and to the said James, now one of the plaintiffs, and James Frontin, after the death of the said James the testator, or to either of them, to render altogether bath refused, and
that to the said James Tawdin the younger, and James Frontin, and
to either of them, yet to render doth refuse, to the damage of the
said James Tawdin the younger and James Frontin Lio,ooo. And
therefore they produce the suit, &c. And the same James Tawdin the
younger, and James Frontin, produce here in court the letters testamentary of the said James Tawdin the testator, by which it sufficiently
appears to the court here, that the said James Tawdin the younger,
and James Frontin are executors of the testament of the said James
Tawdin the elder, and thereof have the administration, &c."
""The Limitations of the Action of Assumpsit, etc.," 56 Am.Law
Register, 73.
" Viner's Abridgment Title Account (A) 5, 15, 32, (E) 2o. Sheppard's Faithful Counsellor, etc., p. 23.
"Professor Langdell in ii Harvard Law Review, p. 253; "Limitations of the Action of Assumpsit, etc.," 56 Am. Law Reg., p. 75-
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Having followed the line of English and American decisions wherein it has been consistently maintained that
consideration consisting of forbearance to sue the principal debtor does not remove a parol promise to pay the debt
of another from the operation of the statute we shall next
exanine the important decisions in which English and Ainerican courts have held promises to be outside the statute.
In 1902, Lord Justice Vaughan-Williams 21 speaking in
the Court of Appeal of a certain group of these last mentioned cases referred to them as "property cases," saying,
"in all those cases there was a larger matter which was the
object of the contract." The position is taken by the present writer that all these so-called "property cases" will be
found upon examination to be instances either of (a) the
liability of the bailee of goods or receiver of monies to
render an account; or, (b) of the liability known as a common law debt.
Until 1766-ninety years after the statute, when the
well known case, WVilliams v. Leper,2 2 was decided there
is a dearth of precedents. 23 Here the goods of Taylor,
the tenant, the landlord having entered to distrain, 24 were
Ilarburg India Rubber Co. v. Marin, L.R. IK. B. 778 (1902).
Burr. S886 (1766).
" In a case brought shortly after the passage of the statute, Lord
Lexington v. Clarke, 2 Ventris, 223 (2 NV. & M. in C. B.), the promise
of a widow to pay rent due from her deceased husband to the plaintiff in consideration that the plaintiff would permit her to hold and
enjoy the premises till our Lady-Day next and to permit her to remove
divers posts, rails and other things fixed and placed upon the premises
by her said husband was regarded as within the statute.
The explanation of the case may be that there was nothing in
the nature of a bailment; for the widow, a tenant by sufferance, was
in possession of both the land and the fixtures before she made the
promise.
2 The Statute of 8 Anne, e. T4, s. I, provided that "no goods or
chattels whatsoever, lying or being in, or upon any messuage, lands, or
tenements, which are or shall be leased for life or lives, term of
years, or will, or otherwise, shall be liable to be taken by virtue of any
execution, on any pretense whatsoever, unless the party at whose
suit the said execution is sued out, shall before the removal of such
goods from off the said premises, by virtue of such execution or'extent pay to the landlord of the said premises, or his bailiff, all such
sum or sums of money as are or shall be due for rent for the said
premises at the time of the taking such goods or chattels, by virtue
=3
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released by the landlord and turned over to the defendant
upon his agreement to pay the rent due, 451. to the plaintiff. As the goods sold for more than 451., no question
arose as to the extent of the defendant's liability. He defended on the ground that his promise to pay Taylor's
debt was within the statute. Mr. Justice Wilnot, said:
"Leper became the bailiff of the landlord; and when he had
sold the goods the money was the landlord's (as far as
451.) in his own bailiff's hands.
Therefore an action would have lain against Leper for
money had and received to the plaintiff's use."'25
Lord Mansfield said: "This case has nothing to do with
the statute of frauds

.

.

.

The goods are the fund:

the question is not between Taylor and the plaintiff.
We find confirmatory proof that the judges were here
correctly reported by noting another report of Williams v.
Leper, by Serjeant Wilson (2 Wilson's Reports, p. 308):
"Curia: This is not a promise to pay the debt of another,
"the goods were debt6r, and the defendant was in nature
"of a bailiff for the landlord, and if the defendant had sold
"the goods and received money for them, an action for
"money had and received for the plaintiff's use would have
"lain in this case, except Aston, who thought if the goods
"had not sold for so much money as the plaintiff's rent, he
"would have been liable for no more than what they sold
"for."

Castling v. Aubert, 6 in 1802. was an action on the case
of such executions, provided the said arrears of rent do not amount
to more than one year's rent; and in case the said arrears shall exceed one year's rent. then the said party at whose suit the execution
is sued out, paying the said landlord or his bailiff one year's rent, may
proceed to execute his judgment, as he might have done before the
making of this act; and the sheriff or other officer is hereby empowerect and required to levy and pay to the plaintiff as well the money
so paid for rent, as the execution money.
See also on point that a manual taking is not necessary to begin
a distress. Swan v. Falnouth, 8 B. & .G. 456 (1828); Wood v. Nunn,
5 Bing. o (1828).
I'illiams v. Leper, 3 Burr. 1886 (1766).
S2 East, 325 (1802).
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to recover damages for breach of an agreement.

"The

plaintiff was tnder acceptances for Grayson for bills drawn
by Grayson for his own accommodation: and plaintiff had
a lien"on certain policies to indeninify himself against his
said acceptances of certain bills which were made for Grayson's accommodation. One acceptance was due and a writ
had been stied against Grayson and the plaintiff. Defendant promised plaintiff, if plaintiff would surrender the policies, to pay that acceptance with costs.
The Court of King's Bench unanimously decided that
on the above facts there should be a verdict for the plaintiff and that the statute was no defence. Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: "It is rather therefore a purchase of the
securities which the plaintiff held in his hands
Upon the whole therefore I agree with the decision in
lVilliams v. Leper, to the full extent of it: I agree with
those of the judges who thought the case not within the
statute of frauds at all: and I also agree with the ground
on which Mr. Justice Aston proceeded, that the evidence
sustains the count for money had and received."
Lawrence, J., said: "This is to be considered as a purchase by the defendant of the plaintiff's interest in 'the
policies." Le Blanc, J., said: "This is a case where one
man having a fund in his hands which was adequate to
the discharge of certain incumbrances; and another party
undertook that if that fund were delivered up to him he
would take it with the incumbrances; this therefore has no
27
relation to the statute of frauds."
If the defendant made himself liable at all events he
became a debtor 28 and therefore the statute had no application. If he was merely a bailee to sell and to render an
account the statute' w ould be equally ifiapplicable to a
transaction which Wvould be not a special promise to answer for the debt of another person but an accountability.
Accord: Borchsenius v. Canutson, ioo II. 82 (1881).
: See ante, note 2o.
'
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Lord Eldon's decision at Nisi Prius, in 18IO,29 is another
application of the principle of Williams v. Leper. The
plaintiff in the principal case had a common law lien for
the repair of carriages and had charged the repairs to one
C. The defendant agreed to pay the repair charge if the
carriages should be delivered to him. After delivery and
refusal to pay assumpsit was brought and the plaintiffs had
a verdict. "If a person got goods into his possession" said
Lord Eldon, "on which the landlord had a right to distrain for rent though it was clearly the debt of another,
yet a note in writing was not necessary.
.
.
The
plaintiffs had to a certain extent a lien upon the carriages,
which they parted with on the defendant's promise to pay:
that, lie thought, took the case out of the statute."
Barrel v. Trussel,30 in I8TI, was an action upon a special agreement brought in the Common Pleas. The plaintiff being in possession of goods under a bill of sale and
being about to sell them surrendered possession to the defendant, his vendor's landlord, upon the latter's verbal
agreement to pay the plaintiff £122, 19S., 6d. The plaintiff was permitted to recover.
In 1817, Edwards v. Kelly, 6 M. & S. 204, presented substantially the same facts as Williams v. Leper. The defendants, Thomas Kelly and Brickwood, received goods
which the plaintiff had previously distrained. The defendants agreed "to pay the plaintiff all such rent as should
appear to be due to him from E. Kelly." The memorandum showing no consideration the Court treated the
bailment as one by parol only. There was judgment
for the plaintiff. The four opinions are significant. Lord
Ellenborough, C. J.: "Perhaps this case might be distinguishable from that of Williams v. Leper, if the goods distrained had not been delivered up to the defendants. But
here was a delivery to them in trust, in effect to raise by
sale of the goods sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's demand;
"Houlditch v. Milme, 3 Esp. 86.
"4 Taunt. 117 (18x).
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the goods were put into their possession subject to this
trust. So that in substance this was an undertaking by the
defendants that the fund should be available for the purpose of liquidating the arrears of rent."
Abbott, J.: "I am unable to distinguish this case in principle from Williams v. Leper, and I find that case was recognized in Houlditch v. Milne and Castling v. Aubert. I
think that this is not a promise to answer the debt of
another."
Two of the justices (Holroyd and Bayley) relied upon
the theory that "the debt was for the time suspended" by
the distress. But this exceedingly narrow and technical
view would limit recovery to cases of novation; which
Castling v. Aubcrt certainly was not.
Nor can the writer assent to the distinction taken by Mr.
Justice Bayley, in reference to the principal case, vic: that
"it is stronger" than Williams v. Leper, "because in that a
distress had not been made, here the plaintiff had the distress in his hands." The statute, 8 Anne, c. 14, s. I, (ante
note 24) was in force when Williams v. Leper was decided.
In 1827, in Bampton v. PauIin (12 Moore's Reports
497), the plaintiff was the landlord of a tenant in arrears.
The landlord had apparently not entered but there were
goods on the premises liable to distress, and "the plaintiff
intended to distrain them for such arrears." The case is
not sufficiently definite as to just what facts of the declaration were proved and what were not, but taking the declaration as proved the .plaintiff though never in possession of
the goods otherwise than constructively had a lien by virtue of the statute of 8 Anne, c. 14, s. I. The goods were
taken away by the defendant in pursuance of an agreement
with plaintiff to sell the goods and apply the proceeds to
the rent. The Common Pleas (Best, C. J., Park, Borough
and Gaselee, J. J.) decided the case by the analogy of the
lien in Castling v. Aubert (supra.) in favor of the plaintiff.
In Thomas v. Williams, IO B. & C. 664 (183o), the decision turns on another point-the entirety of the promise-

NEW AND OLD READING ON FOURTH

but the correctness of Edwards v. Kelly and of Castling v.
Aubert is admitted.
The decision of Tindal, C. J., at Nisi Prius, in 1834, in
11alker v. Taylor (6 C. & P. 752), is sufficiently dramatic
to merit notice. The plaintiff was an undertak-r and had
agreed with the widow of a publican who kept the King's
Head, in IHolborn, to bury her husband if she gave him
security for the bill. The widow accordingly gave the
undertaker as security the beer and spirit licenses under
which her late husband had operated. The defendant was
the administrator of the decedent and was also his creditor.
By agreement the plaintiff surrendered the beer and spirit
licenses upon the defendant's personal assumption of the
debt of his intestate. The defendant's objection that he
could not be held on this verbal promise was overruled.
Exactly in accord with this view is another decision rendered in the same year by the Exchequer (Parke & Alderson, B. B.), where the landlord being in possession of the
tenant's effects under a distress for rent, agreed with the
defendant, the tenant's-assignee in bankruptcy, to withdraw
the distress in exchange for the defendant's promise to pay
the rent. The plaintiff having withdrawn the distress, the
defendant having obtained possession of the goods was held
liable on his verbal promise. Stephens v. Pell, 2 Cr. & Mees.
710 (1834).

Lord Tenterden, C. J., sees the action of Account as
through a glass darkly when he observes: "There is no
case in which the promise of payment has gone beyond the
amount of the right vested in the party to whom the promise was made, or beyond the assumed value of the fund out
of which the payment was to be made."
The complement of the recognition of the law of account
in Williams v. Leper, is found in a decision of the Irish
Exchequer, in 1845.3 The plaintiff was the landlord and
had made a distress. The defendant verbally promised to
pay the rent due by one Carrigan, if the plaintiff would
' Fennel v. Mulcahy, 8 Irish Law Reports, 434 (1845).
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withdraw his distress. This was done. The defendant
claimed the protection of the Statute. Brady, C. B., commenting on the opinion of Mr. Justice Wilmot, in Witliams v. Leper,3 2 says: "He then adds what I consider
to be important; 'Leper became the bailiff of the landlord,
and when he had sold the goods, the money was the landlord's as far as 451 in his own baliff's hands. Therefore
an action would have lain against Leper for money had
and received to the plaintiff's use.' Yates, J., seemed to
think that there was an original consideration moving to
the defendant.

.

.

.

That case contained matter not

occurring here, because in this case the goods are not stated
to have been assigned to the defendant or sold by him,
and we must take it that in fact they were given back to
Corrigan, and therefore there is no pretence for saying
that the defendant here was liable to the plaintiff in assumpsit as for money had and received."
In the same opinion Chief Baron Brady-speaking of Edwards v. Kelly,3 3 reiterates the same position: "There the
goods were delivered over to the person making the promise, by whom they were sold, and who undertook to pay
over their produce, and the goods were in truth sold by
the person who may be considered as the bailiff of the party
to whom the promise was made." Finally, Brady, C. B.,
applying his test to the 'case in judgment said: "The first
question here then is, what liability has the defendant. incurred? Plainly none, except on his promise. He did not
become a trustee or bailiff for the plaintiff. No goods
were left in his hands, or of the produce of which he was
to pay this debt." "Nonsuit entered."
Fitzgeraldv. Dressier,34 decided in 1859, is a unanimous
recognition by the Common Pleas that the delivery to the
defendant of property upon which the plaintiff has a lien
renders the defendant liable if he has orally agreed to dis3 Burr. i886 (x766).
6 M. & S. 2o4 ( 8').
7 C. B. (N. S.) 374 (1859).
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charge the lien. Here the lien resulted from the antecedent
and subsisting debt of a third person and that debt was
not discharged.
Numerous American decisions will likewise be found to
the same effect that the surrender of property to the defendant, on which the plaintiff has a lien, in exchange for
the defendant's promise to pay the thus secured debt of a
third person to the plaintiff is not a special promise to
answer for the debt of another within the statute.3 5
The case of the del credere bailiff or factor is merely a
particular species of accountability. The terms of any bailment to account are provable by parol. The defence was
always permissible in Account before the auditors that
although the goods had been sold that the vendee's debt
was uncollectible by the bailiff,-8 provided lie had authority
to sell on credit and not been negligent.3 7
A del credere factorship was merely one in which this
usual defence was by agreement denied to the bailee. The
words, "No action shall be brought upon any special promise to answer for the debt, &c., of another person" cannot
properly apply to an action to enforce an accounting for
the reason that the action of account is here brought on the
bailment to account and there is no action brought upon
'There was no no%.ation in any of the following cases: Green
v. Hadfield, 89 Wis. 138 (1894): Joseph. ct al., v. Sith, 57 N. W.
(Neb.) 1012 (18,4); Adams v.Brown, 32 S. W. 282 (1895); s. C. 17
Ky. Law Reporter. 6.34: Alger v. Scozille, i Gray, 391 (1854).
The language of Shaw, C. J., in the last cited case is noteworthy
because it is an echo of Williams v. Leper: "this was a new and original
contract between these parties, originating in a new consideration moving from the plaintiff to the defendant, in effect placing the funds in
the hands of the defendant out of which these notes in due course of
business would be expected to be paid."
Compare, also. his previous opinion in Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Met.
306 (x84), where he held that a son's promise to pay his father's
debt in consideration of forbearance to prosecute a pending suit therefor
was within the statute. His sweeping dictum in Nelson v. Boynzton, so
often quoted. "Cases are not considered as coming within the statute
when the party promising has for his object a benefit which he did not
before enjoy, accruing immediately to himself" should not be extended
beyond the facts of that case.
" Barton v. Sadock, i Buls. 1O3 (16::); Anon., 2 Mod. :oo (1676).
" Leerick v. Meigs, i Cowen, 645 (1884).
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the guaranty. The guaranty is only one of the terms of
the defendants' accountability.
Consistent with the above position are the decisions holding that a del credere factorship is not within the statute of
frauds.3 8
The words of Parker, C. J., in 1828, 39 smacks of
the language of Rolle, of Coke, of the judges in
the Year Books: "The legal effect of such a contract is
to make them liable at all events for the proceeds of the
sale, so that according to some of the authorities, though
denied by others, they may be charged on indebitatus assumpsit, or for goods sold to them. And there seems to
be no reason why they should not be so charged, if upon
receiving the goods they become accountable, except that
..
their liability is not fixed until a sale is made .
But as the action cannot be sustained until after the sale
has taken place, and then there is no legal excuse for not
paying, the form of the action does not seem very material."
The language of Mr. Justice Cowen, in Wolff v. Koppel,40 is significant, echoing in 1843 principles of contract
law which in the course of a hundred years had become
somewhat faint. He said: "A guaranty though by parol
is not always within the statute. . . . The merchant
holds the goods and will not part with them to the factor
without this extraordinary stipulation and a commission is
paid to him for entering into it. What is this after all
but another form of selling the goods? . . . Instead
of paying cash the factor prefers to contract a debt or duty
which obliges him to see the money paid. This debt or
.
upon non-payment by the venduty is his own .
.
the
dee, the debt falls absolutely on the factor .
action is in effect to recover the factor's own debt." . . .
'Couturier v. Hastie, 8 Ex. 40 (1852); 9 Ex. 1o2 (i853). In Suman
v. Inman, 6 Mo. App. 384 (z878), the court speaks of the debts due as
on sales.
"Swan v. Nesmith, 7 Pick. =o (i828).
"5 Hill (N. Y.) 458 (1843); affirmed in 2 Denio, 368.
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"The effect of the commission" (i. e., del credere), said
Woodworth, J., in 1824, in Leverick v. Melts," "is not to

extinguish the relation between principal and factor, but
applies solely to a guaranty that the purchaser shall pay."
In Couturier v. Ilastie,42 the Court of Exchequer held, in
1852, that a parol del credere factorship was not within the
statute. Baron Parke, speaking for that Court, said:
"Doubtless if they had for a percentage guarantied the
debt owing or performance of the contract by the vendee
being totally unconnected with the sale they would not
be liable without a note in writing signed by them; but
being the agents to negotiate the sale the commission is
pail in respect of that employment.
.
This is the
main object of the reward being given to them; and though
it may terminate in a liability to pay the debt of another
that is not the immediate object for which the consideration is given, and the case resembles in this respect those of
IVilliains v. Leper,43 and Castling v. Aubert.""

Crawford D. Hening.
(To be Continued)
"i Cowen 664 (824).
"8 Exchequer Reports, 55 (i8pz).
' Supra.

"Supra.

